Immigration Law: Case Brief-Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338

Damione Verdusco

PA 401 – Unit 9

Case Brief

January 18, 2011

Memorandum

TO: J. Jones, Senior Partner

FROM: D. Verdusco, Paralegal

DATE: January 18, 2011

RE: Jane Doe Asylum Case

SUBJECT: Case Brief: Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d. 1338

Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F. 3d 1338 (2000)

Procedural History:

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (No. 00-002606-CV-KMM). K. Michael Moore, Judge. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3225 (S.D. Fla., 2000)

Facts

Plaintiff minor alien, the sole survivor of a tragedy at sea, was rescued and placed in the care of his great uncle, plaintiff temporary legal custodian, who filed an asylum application on his behalf against the of wishes his father in Cuba. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) rejected the application as legally void. Plaintiff minor appealed to the district court, which dismissed the case because plaintiff minor's father was solely authorized to apply for his son's asylum. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal as violative of § 1158 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1996 (INA), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101 et seq. At issue was whether plaintiff minor applied for asylum within the meaning of the INA when he or a non-parental relative submitted an application for asylum against parental wishes. Because the law was silent about the validity of such asylum applications, it fell to the INS, as an executive agency, to make a discretionary policy decision. The court affirmed the district court's judgment; the policy decision made was reasonable. The INS did not abuse its discretion or act arbitrarily in applying the policy in rejecting plaintiffs' asylum applications.

Issue

Can a non-parental relative file an application for asylum on behalf of a child who lacks the capacity to file for himself, against the express wishes of the child’s parents?

Rule

  8 USCS §1158

 

§ 1158 Asylum

(a) Authority to apply for asylum

(1) In general. Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 1225 (b) of this title.

Application

The important legal question in this case, therefore, is not whether Plaintiff may apply for asylum; instead, the ultimate inquiry is whether child has applied for asylum within the meaning of the statute when he, or a non-parental relative on his behalf, signs and submits a purported application against the express wishes of the child's parent.

Because the statute is silent on the issue, Congress has left a gap in the statutory scheme. From that gap springs executive discretion. As a matter of law, it is not for the courts, but for the executive agency charged with enforcing the statute (here, the INS), to choose how to fill such gaps. 11 See Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2793. That Congress left a gap in the statutory scheme does not mean that Congress has done something wrong. Whether Congress could or should legislate with sufficient detail to address every conceivable set of circumstances that may arise is highly debatable.  Moreover, the authority of the executive branch to fill gaps is especially great in the context of immigration policy. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. at 1445. Our proper review of the exercise by the executive branch of its discretion to fill gaps, therefore, must be very limited. See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2534, 115 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1991).

Conclusion

This case, at first sight, seems to be about little more than a child and his father. But, for this Court, the case is mainly about the separation of powers under our constitutional system of government: a statute enacted by Congress, the permissible scope of executive discretion under that statute, and the limits on judicial review of the exercise of that executive discretion. Because preexisting law compelled no particular policy for plaintiffs' situation, Immigration and Naturalization Service was entitled to make policy decision: that plaintiff's father was proper person to apply for plaintiff's asylum. Policy was not abuse of discretion; its application, resulting in rejection of asylum applications, was not arbitrary. Policy also did not contradict relevant statute.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.